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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: The Langley Site for our New Headquarters
Building

1. PROBLEM

Should we persist in our intention to locate our new building at Langley?

2. FACTS

a. Our authorization provide \$46,000,000 for a building, \$8.5 million for the extension of the George Washington Memorial Parkway if we locate at Langley, and \$1,000,000 to acquire a site if we locate elsewhere.

b. We have \$5.5 million already appropriated; \$2.5 million for the Parkway and \$3 million for the preparation of plans and other preliminary steps.

c. Our authorization and appropriation were obtained with the clear understanding on the part of the President and Congress that while we were excepted from "dispersal standards" we would definitely not locate in the District of Columbia, but rather on the fringe of the metropolitan area of greater Washington.

d. The National Capital Regional Planning Council indorsed our proposal to locate at Langley by a five to three vote with two members abstaining.

e. The National Capital Planning Commission voted against our proposal by a vote of six to five with the Public Buildings Service not voting due to absence. (Three absentee votes were, however, cast by letter.)

f. The CIA is required by law to reply to the National Capital Planning Commission if it does not concur with the action recommended in their preliminary report, but is not legally bound by their decision.

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g. Our use of the Langley site is highly controversial and, no doubt, will remain so during our presentation to the Congress for additional funds to complete the project.

h. Langley is the only site for which preliminary plans and cost estimates can be prepared in time to make a presentation to Congress during this session.

3. DISCUSSION

a. With the District of Columbia eliminated, we conducted a most comprehensive study of this problem and concluded that Langley was best suited to our needs. This was confirmed by Clarke and Rapuano, who in my judgment, have made the only other objective study of the matter. They are the only people who have given serious consideration to the needs of this Agency. Others may have tried to be objective but have again, in my judgment, concentrated on the consistency of our proposal with a five-year old comprehensive master plan, which can't remain static forever, and have shown little appreciation for our problems ... such as convenience to the location of agencies with which we work, or convenience of our headquarters to our employees' places of residence.

b. The Chairmen of both the National Capital Regional Planning Council and the National Capital Planning Commission, and their staffs, have always opposed our use of Langley. They have, of course, played a major role in guiding the Council and the Commission and intentionally or unintentionally, I believe that they have not been entirely fair and objective in their actions.

c. Although the National Capital Regional Planning Council voted for us it was a vote almost one-hundred percent along jurisdictional lines and, had a different set of circumstances existed on that particular day, the outcome might have been different. For example, had the Alexandria member not died, causing a vote to be cast by a Falls Church member, the vote would have been four to four. In that case the Chairman undoubtedly would have voted against us, making it five to four against us. In addition, if the Chairman of the National Capital Planning Commission, who is a member of the Regional Council, had been present he might also have voted against us. It is apparent that while the vote was five to three for us, it could just as easily have been six to four against us. My point is that with the exception of

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the District of Columbia member, the Maryland and Virginia delegations voted one-hundred percent along jurisdictional lines with the exception of the one Maryland member from Montgomery County who realized that Montgomery County would benefit if we located at Langley.

d. It is significant to note, however, that prior to casting the ballot, individual members of the Council, who subsequently voted in favor of Langley, expressed themselves in a manner which appears to place definite qualifications upon their individual voting action. Each member of the Council, with the exception of the Fairfax County representative, stated that the access roads and bridges which Clarke and Rapuano and the Agency had specified as the minimum necessary, would not be adequate to meet the requirements of this facility, and that the Federal Government should be prepared to make funds available to meet the additional requirements they considered essential. In addition, immediately following the casting of the ballot, the Council adopted a resolution, by a unanimous vote, that the CIA be requested to "ask for authorization and appropriation for the improvements not yet committed which are related to this development as described in the report of its Director:

- (1) Chain Bridge widening along with Canal Road and Weaver Place improvement.
- (2) Virginia Route 123 Parkway to Chain Bridge.
- (3) Glebe Road - Lee Highway to Chain Bridge.
- (4) Parkway to Cabin John Bridge including Cabin John Bridge.
- (5) George Washington Memorial Parkway - Maryland side.
- (6) Outer Belt - Route 7 in Virginia to U. S. 240 in Maryland.

e. In this connection, Clarke and Rapuano and the Agency have said that only three improvements will be necessary:

- (1) Four-lane Route 123 from Parkway to intersection with Route 193.
- (2) Extension of George Washington Memorial Parkway on Virginia side from present terminus to the site.

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- (3) Improvements to Key Bridge for which the contract has already been let.

It should be emphasized that at no time has any other party expressed agreement with this position taken by Clarke and Rapuano and the Agency. Quite to the contrary, this has been a major point at issue; and is one of the two primary bases for the adverse action taken by the National Capital Planning Commission. Every other party expressing any views regarding this subject has emphasized the inadequacy of these improvements.

f. The Commission voted against us six to five. Senator Neely, who I understand has never attended a single meeting of the Commission, voted against us by letter. Congressman Broyhill voted for us by letter under a delegation of authority from Congressman McMillan. Had a site in Maryland been under consideration, Congressman McMillan undoubtedly would have delegated Congressman Hyde authority to vote. Although Senator Neely and Congressman Broyhill both voted by letter and Congressman Broyhill was given a week in which to cast his vote, the Public Buildings Service member, who was absent because of illness, was not permitted to cast a deferred vote. It is almost certain that the Public Buildings Service member would have voted favorably. It is probable that P.B.S or G.S.A. deliberately did not make arrangements to cast a vote because our difference regarding our proposed construction had not been settled. The Chairman also voted which is his right, but which he does not customarily do except to break a tie. Here again the vote could just as easily have been quite different.

g. Again, it is most significant to note that every favorable vote in the Commission is qualified by the expectation that Federal funds will be necessary and available to provide extensive highway and bridge improvements far in excess of the minimum regarded as necessary by Clarke and Rapuano. In addition, it is most significant that the vote in the National Capital Planning Commission is divided between:

- (1) the theoretical planners opposing Langley on the grounds of impact on the area and the amount of money required to make the improvements they regard as necessary; and
- (2) the individuals favoring Langley who represent jurisdictions charged with responsibility of implementing plans and accomplishing objectives.

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h. The extent of the impact upon the area is purely a matter of conjecture, and is the only one of the two major points upon which the action of the Commission is conditioned wherein there is a lack of unanimity. Every member of the Commission and Council agrees that highway and bridge improvements will be necessary far in excess of those stated as the minimum essential requirements by Clarke and Rapuano, and that these improvements can and should only be made through an extensive outlay of funds by the Federal Government. The point to be especially emphasized, it seems to me, is that those who favor Langley are those charged with responsibility for the practical implementation of plans and objectives. They are apparently willing to modify the Master Plan and use this building at Langley as a lever to obtain funds from the Federal Government for the accomplishment of nearly every highway and bridge improvement planned for the area over the next twenty years.

i. The proposal to locate the Central Intelligence Agency headquarters building at Langley, Virginia, has been and continued to be an extremely controversial issue. We cannot go to the Congress for an appropriation until a site has been selected because we must have a site in order that plans and specifications can be developed as a firm basis for reasonable cost estimates. If we proceed to Langley, which it is our prerogative to do, we must expect that the controversy will intensify appreciably, and that the primary issue will be the amount of money necessary to expend to accommodate us at Langley. It must be emphasized that this is an election year and, therefore, an economy year. It must also be emphasized that we stand alone in claiming that the expenditure of vast sums of money will not be necessary.

j. If we continue to plan for our facilities at Langley, the architect-engineer should be able to complete the necessary plans, specifications, and cost estimates in time for a presentation to Congress this year, since planning could proceed simultaneously with other actions. If we should abandon the Langley site we would have to go through this entire procedure again. This, coupled with other delays, would make it impossible to get an additional appropriation from Congress this year. This would mean a delay of approximately one year in our whole project.

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k. No doubt if we persist in going to Langley we are in for a fight and may lose. If we go to Maryland we will also have a fight and there will be additional costs since no site is going to be tailor-made to accommodate this project. If we should decide to reconsider the District of Columbia we would have to obtain the approval of the President and would have to amend our basic authorization to allow at least six million dollars for the procurement of land, and we would have to seek this additional appropriation. Again, specific plans could not be prepared in time to be considered by this session of the Congress and in this case we will have a real fight on our hands with proponents of Virginia and Maryland sites.

4. CONCLUSIONS

a. Under the circumstances it seems not only our legal right but also our moral duty to interpret the actions of the two planning bodies and to shoulder the final responsibility for our selection.

b. Langley is still the best site. It will be a fight to get it, but it is going to be a fight to get any alternate site approved. Abandoning Langley will delay the project approximately one year, and if you then lose the fight for an alternate site, which is entirely possible, you will be delayed even longer. If we fight for Langley and lose you are no worse off.

c. A positive decision to locate at Langley is essential not later than 15 February 1956 in order to have such plans and estimates ready for presentation by 1 May. This is the latest date on which these plans and estimates should be submitted to Congress to insure that our request receives proper consideration.

d. If we are going to carry the fight for Langley further, we will have to ascertain whether the President and key members of the Congress will support us in the face of the adverse position of the two planning bodies.

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5. RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That we make another presentation in support of the Langley site to the National Capital Planning Commission at its 5 February 1956 meeting.

b. That in the interim we ascertain whether the President and key members of Congress will support us in our choice of the Langley site.

c. That we reserve the final decision pending the outcome of Recommendations Nos. 1 and 2, but that we be prepared to make a decision immediately after the 5 February meeting of the Commission and in no case later than 15 February.



L. K. WHITE
Deputy Director (Support)

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